The difficulty with the conflict between Israel and Palestine is that it has so many components. Immigration, national identity, empires and colonialism, democracy, religion and modernisation, terrorism, victimisation and persecution, war.

Even when focusing on the simplest building blocks of its very beginnings, we can see how more than anything, subtle emphases – differences between well-intentioned observers – matters.

Because of this, I’ve carefully selected three main sources, and drawn on others. The first, and one I recommend the most, is a very readable textbook called Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East. It’s by three scholars: Abdel Monem Said Ally, Shai Feldman, and Khalil Shikaki, and it pays careful attention to different historical narratives before analysing them as even-handedly as possible.

Then, Palestinian-American historian Rashid Khalidi’s, The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine is from a Palestinian perspective, while Israeli writer Ari Shavit’s My Promised Land is from an Israeli one.

Of course, even referring to a perspective as ‘Israeli’ or ‘Palestinian’ is an enormous oversimplification, ignoring the vast differences there always are within and between groups. I’ve also drawn on a few historians who’ve been labelled Israeli ‘new historians’ – this loose group have challenged a traditional historical narrative in Israel, something we’ll come to. The literature on this is vast, intellectual humility is required, and so I will focus only on the origins. I’ll also return to a note on how and why I’ve approached this in the way I have at the end.

Towards the end of the 19th century, outbreaks of violence against Jews called pogroms increased across Eastern Europe.

In most countries, Jews were second class citizens. They couldn’t own land, vote, had different and varying legal rights, and were marginalised, lived in ghettos, and often randomly blamed for problems and were targeted and murdered.

This was coming to a head in the last two decades of the 19th century.

In 1881, in the Russian Empire, Jewish communities were attacked after Tsar Alexander II was assassinated and one of the conspirators had incidentally had Jewish ancestry. A wave of pogroms resulted. But this was just one of many instances. In modern day Moldova in 1903, 49 were killed, and many more injured, raped, and homes were attacked.

It’s important to remember that this is relatively borderless period. Palestine had been administered by the decaying Ottoman Empire for centuries. It was home to a small number of Jews already who lived peacefully with a majority of Arabs, mainly Muslims, with a few Christians.

This was a period very different from today. Empires were the norm, borders were always changing, but the idea of ‘nation-states’, that peoples had the right to self-determine, to govern themselves, was on the rise. In 1800 the population of Palestine was 2% Jewish – some 6700 Jews. By 1890, 42,000 Jews had moved there, while the Arab population was around 500,000. By 1922, the Jewish population had doubled to 83,000.

Towards the end of the 19th century, Jewish settlers started buying land from absent urban Arab landlords, leading to the displacement of the Arab peasants who had worked the land. 500 Arabs signed a letter of complaint to the Ottomans about this in 1891.

In My Promised Land, Ari Shavit describes the complex and sometimes contradictory motivations of the young Zionist movement at the end of the 19th century. For some, fleeing violence, it was a matter of life and death, for others, like his own British great-grandfather, it was a complex choice, one comprised of solidarity with those fleeing persecution, a romantic idea of the Holy Land, and a modern idea of it too – that a new thriving modern future could be built in a land that was widely and falsely seen as empty.

Judaic Studies professor David Novak has written: ‘The modern Zionism that emerged in the late nineteenth century was clearly a secular nationalist movement’. However it had deep religious and historical roots to draw on as well – that Palestine was the Jewish ancestral homeland, the Exodus from Egypt to the promised land, and later exiles from the region, and returns. But Zionism was never unified – many, many disagreed, religious and secular alike, and those who agreed or became Zionists did so for many reasons. Shavit points out that travellers from places like Britain didn’t see Palestine for what it was. They saw empty desert. They saw a few Bedouin tribes. They saw possibility. They didn’t see the Palestinian villages and towns, or maybe, he says, they chose to ignore them?

They also saw poverty – dirt huts and tiny villages. They believed, or said they believed – as many colonists also claim, it’s important to note – that the indigenous population would benefit from Jewish capital, education, technology, and ideas, and it’s true that many did.

Drawing on his grandfather’s diaries, Shavit asks why his grandfather ‘did not see’. After all, he was served by Arab stevedores, Arab staff at hotels, Arab villagers carried his carriages, was led by Arab guides and horseman, was shown Arab cities.

He uses a word: blindness. They were too focused on a romantic ideal of the area and the tragic oppression they were fleeing from. Shavit writes: ‘Between memory and dream there is no here and now.’

Not everyone was blind, though. At the beginning of the 20th century one Zionist author, Israel Zangwill, gave a speech in New York that reported that Palestine was not empty. That they would have to ‘drive out by sword the tribes in possession, as our forefathers did.’

This was heresy. No one wanted to hear it. He was ignored.

So between 1890 and 1913, around 80,000 Zionists emigrated. In the short period between WWI and WWII the same number again. But this snowballed with the rise of Nazism in the 1930s. Between 1933-1940, 250,000 fled Germany. In 1935 alone, 60,000 moved to Palestine. More than the entire Jewish population in 1917.

With this came millions in capital and investment, and successful settlements, villages, and towns began growing.

This huge demographic movement coincided with the most important shift of power in the region. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire during WWI and the subsequent British takeover of control.

During WWI, Zionists in Palestine provided valuable information to Britain, formed spy networks, and volunteered to fight.

At the same time, a coalition of Arabs supported Britain by rising up against the Ottomans in the Great Arab Revolt. In return they were promised an independent Arab state by the British.

But Britain made several contradictory promises in quick succession.

In 1917, the Balfour Declaration – a memo between Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour and Lord Rothschild – committed the British Government to a home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

The Balfour declaration neglected to mention the word Arab, who comprised 94% of the population. It read: ‘His Majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’

Here lies the root of the conflict; the contradictory promise: ‘when the promised land became twice promised’, in the words of historian Avi Shlaim.

Reporting this news in Palestine was banned by the British.

Instead, after the defeat of the Ottomans, the British and French divided the area into spheres of influence under the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, leaving Palestine as a British mandate under British control. This was the famous ‘line in the sand’, made by people who had little knowledge of the area.

In a private 1919 memo only published 30 years later, Lord Balfour admitted: ‘In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country… The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.’

The British Mandate gave the Jewish Agency in Palestine status as a public body to help run the country. Jewish communities and leaders formed institutions for self-defence and governance, which the British slowly recognised, essentially becoming a government in waiting.

As a result, outbreaks of violence began to increase in the 1920s, getting progressively worse. In 1929, hundreds of Jews and Arabs were killed and hundreds more wounded at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. Tensions rose, resulting in a series of massacres of Jews by Arabs, one of which in Hebron resulted in the death of almost 70 Jews and the injuring of many more. In response to the violence, the British declared a state of emergency. They proposed a legislative council that would be comprised of six nominated British and four nominated Jewish members, and twelve elected members, including two Christians, two Jews, and eight Muslims.

Seeing themselves as outnumbered on a governing panel in a country in which they were the clear majority, Palestinians rejected the proposal. Another was proposed that was slightly fairer to the Palestinians, but this time it was rejected by the Zionists and British parliament.

During the largest wave of immigration as the Nazis came to power, Palestinians called for a general strike demanding an end to Jewish migration and the sale of land to Zionists by absentee urban landlords, which continued to dispossess peasants working the land.

In 1936, an Arab revolt started when gunmen shot three Jews, setting off a series of attacks and counterattacks, leading to the deaths of around 415 Jews and 101 British. The British response was swift and brutal. 5000 Arabs were killed by the British, violence continued into 1937, and many were imprisoned and exiled. 10% of the Arab population were killed, injured, exiled, or imprisoned.

Kahlidi puts the figure higher, writing: ‘The bloody war waged against the country’s majority, which left 14 to 17 percent of the adult male Arab population killed, wounded, imprisoned, or exiled.’

Said Ally, Feldman, and Shikaki write that it was ‘disastrous for the Palestinians.’

In one instance an 81-year-old rebel leader was executed after being found with a single bullet. The British tied Palestinian prisoners to the front of their cars to prevent ambushes. Homes were destroyed. Many were tortured and beaten, including at least one woman.

However as a result of the unrest, in 1937 a British government report recommends two states for the first time. The Arab state, though, would not be Palestinian. It was to be merged with Transjordan.

In 1939, British government policy, put forward in a white paper, decided to call for a single jointly administered Palestine, and limited Jewish immigration and land sales.

The Holocaust changed all this. And even more disastrous for the Palestinians was the leadership’s decisions to side with Hitler in 1941, as he had told them that the Nazis had no plans to occupy Arab lands.

As the true extent of the Holocaust became clearer, the plight of European Jews became more urgent in the eyes of European and US policymakers. It’s crucial to remember the extent of the horror – six million Jews industrially murdered. After the war, there were 250,000 Jews living in refugee camps in Germany alone. Britain was bankrupt and was pulling out of many of its former colonies. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt gained their independence, and they formed the Arab League.

More plans were proposed, including the Morrison-Grady Plan in 1946 calling for two separate autonomous Arab and Israeli regions under British defence, which was again rejected by both Zionists and Palestinians.

A UN plan in 1947 proposed 43% of the area going to Palestinians, despite them comprising two thirds of the population. It was rejected by the Arab Higher Committee who called for a three-day general strike.

The newly independent (or quasi-independent, at least) surrounding Arab states were becoming increasingly hostile to Zionism and the plight of the Palestinians. But they also saw potential to either increase their own territory or to gain power in the region. Egypt saw itself as a new Ottoman Empire. King Abdullah of Transjordan saw Palestine as part of Transjordan. He thought that victory in the war against Israel would be secured in ‘no more than ten days.’

The USSR, seeing the potential of a state of Israel as a socialist ally, provided weapons to the Zionists. Seeing themselves as decisively outnumbered and outgunned, with no tanks, navy, or aircraft (the Arab countries, to varying degrees, did have this equipment), Ben-Gurion secured a deal with Czechoslovakia for $28m worth of weapons and ammunition, increasing their supply by 25% and ammunition by 1000%. In 1968, Ben-Gurion remembered, ‘the Czech weapons truly saved the state of Israel. Without these weapons we would not have remained alive’.

By now the Palestinians and Zionists were in a state of civil war, with continued attacks and counterattacks.

In early 1948, knowing the British would leave, Arab countries were preparing to invade and Jewish state institutions-in-waiting prepared a plan of defence. And there were already Jewish settlements outside of the proposed UN partition boundaries, and of course, many Palestinian areas within.

Zionist leadership prepared what was referred to as Plan D, which included, ‘self-defense against invasion by regular or semi-regular forces’, and ‘freedom of military and economic activity within the borders of the [Hebrew] state and in Jewish settlements outside its borders’.

All of this was made worse by British bankruptcy and a hard-line Zionist militant group called Irgun, who bombed the British Mandate headquarters, killing 92 people, and were involved in skirmishes with Palestinians. In one attack in April of 1948, Irgun killed 115-250 men, women, and children in a village near Jerusalem, despite a non-aggression pact.

So on 15 May 1948, the British left. The day before, David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the new state of Israel. The day after, a coalition of Arab forces from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded.

For the most part, Israel captured and defended the areas allotted to them by the 1947 UN plan, as well as areas outside of it.

Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee their homes. Palestinians call it the Nakba – the Catastrophe.

The result of the war was the Gaza strip coming under Egypt’s control, the West Bank contested but under the control of Jordan’s forces, to be annexed in 1950, and anywhere between 400,000 and a million Palestinians displaced.

There is complexity, and this is only a small fraction of this story, but it’s impossible to ignore that the Nakba was a catastrophe – power differentials, foreign influence, empire, failures to compromise, perpetration of atrocities, the loss of homes and land that would never be returned to. The Palestinians were divided, outnumbered, and kept weak by Britain, Zionists, the US, the USSR and their surrounding Arab neighbours.

Journalist Arthur Koestler famously said that, ‘One nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third’.

While British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had tried to limit immigration to Palestine, he was replaced by Winston Churchill, one of the biggest supporters of Zionism in British public life. In 1937 Churchill said of Palestine that: ‘I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger even though he may have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly wise race to put it that way, has come in and taken their place’.

In response to the UN planning to partition Palestine in 1947, several Arab countries warned, or even threatened, violence against Jews in their own countries and expulsion. In 1950 and 51 Iraq withdrew Jews of their Iraqi nationality and property rights. Antisemitism in Yemen led to the migration of 50,000 Jews between 1949-1950. There were attacks on Jews in Tripoli before the war in 1945. Whether punitive policies and attitudes began before the war or as a result of it is a matter of debate.

What becomes clear, though, is that moral questions depend on the minutiae of often unanswerable questions; ones that historians are still, often acrimoniously, debating.

Who, which groups and subgroups, were most responsible for violence in ‘47? Were 19th century Zionists ‘blind’, ‘altruistic’, in existential danger? Are they colonisers in the usual sense? Or victims fleeing from violence in Europe?

Shavit writes that, ‘these pilgrims do not represent Europe. On the contrary. They are Europe’s victims. And they are here on behalf of Europe’s ultimate victims.’

Anyone who tells you that answers are easy to come by are wrong. Antisemitism was at its height in the 1940s. The Holocaust had just happened. Jewish immigrants had purchased land and settled in Palestine peacefully for decades. But amongst these difficulties, there are some indisputable facts. The UN partition plan offered Palestinians 43% of the land despite them comprising 68% of the population. And around 700,000 Palestinians became refugees.

Shavit cites a letter written from an Israeli he knew who fought the 1947-48 war. He wrote about the time: ‘when I think of the thefts, the looting, the robberies and recklessness, I realize that these are not merely separate incidents. Together they add up to a period of corruption. The question is earnest and deep, really of historic dimensions. We will all be held accountable for this era. We shall face judgment. And I fear that justice will not be on our side’.

And this is one report from an Israeli military governor, reporting a conversation with Palestinian dignitaries when Palestinians were forced from the small city of Lydda in 1948:

DIGNITARIES: What will become of the prisoners detained in the mosque?

GOVERNOR: We shall do to the prisoners what you would do had you imprisoned us.

DIGNITARIES: No, no, please don’t do that.

GOVERNOR: Why, what did I say? All I said is that we will do to you what you would do to us.

DIGNITARIES: Please no, master. We beg you not to do such a thing.

GOVERNOR: No, we shall not do that. Ten minutes from now the prisoners will be free to leave the mosque and leave their homes and leave Lydda along with all of you and the entire population of Lydda.

DIGNITARIES: Thank you, master. God bless you.

And in many cases, people left before the war broke out. In one case, the Israeli mayor even begged the Palestinians to stay. Although this was the only case.

For many years, the ‘Israeli’ narrative – although to call it that is far too simplistic, ignoring the disagreements, differences, and dissent within the conversation – was that the surrounding Arab states called upon the Arabs in Palestine to leave so that they could invade.

School books in Israel taught that Israelis wanted peace, but they were surrounded by enemies who wanted their destruction; that the Arabs fled to safety as a natural process of war.

This was challenged in the 1980s as official archives were opened, and a generation of ‘new’ Israeli historians looked differently at the period.

Benny Morris, one of those new historians, argued that there was no master plan of expulsion. However, it was understood that it was in the leadership’s interests to establish a Jewish state with as small of a minority of Palestinian Arabs as possible.

Most say the order came from Ben-Gurion himself. Those saying this include the later Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who reported in his autobiography that Ben-Gurion had given him the order to expel the Palestinian Arabs in Lydda. When Rabin tried to publish this in 1979 it was censored.

What’s clear is that there was an overwhelming atmosphere – of fear, of exodus, of violence and beatings, of many massacres, of war in general – that led to 700,000 Palestinians leaving their homes, never to return.

Sources:

Understanding Israel and Palestine: A Reading List